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 Away with Green Aesthetics! 
Mateusz Salwa 
People tend to agree that green spaces are ecologically beneficial (even 
if some are not), but they do not see that finding them beneficial implies 
that they should cultivate, protect and restore them or the quality of 
human life risks to deteriorate. The reasons for this ecological 
indifference are multiple, but two of them are, in my opinion, of major 
importance. 
First, ecological impact seems to be an abstract scientific fact that is 
measurable though not necessarily palpable; something discussed by 
experts and not felt by ordinary people on a daily basis. When a city tree 
is felled, hardly anyone considers the annual loss of cubic meters of 
oxygen. Yet on a sunny day, many inhabitants will definitely regret the 
disappearance of its refreshing shade. Second, appreciating green 
spaces for their ecological significance is risky because it amounts to 
considering solely their instrumental value, which may result in 
appreciating them in terms of efficiency. From this perspective, one 
might rationalize replacing a tree with some equally effective “ecological 
device.” For now, nature stands protected but only because it is less 
expensive than its ersatz counterparts. Were costs to reverse, it could 
become extremely difficult to persuade technocratic societies to protect 
nature for its productive potential alone. 
Paradoxically, creation, protection, and restoration of natural spaces 
insofar as their ecological impact is at stake must be promoted also for 
reasons other than efficiency and in other ways than referring to tables 
and graphs. One such strategy embraces their aesthetic qualities. 
There is little doubt that we tend to care for what we like. Of course we 
like things for different reasons, practical, economic, symbolic, etc., but 
more often than not we like them for how they appear to us in the 
simplest sense, i.e. for their sensuous appeal. Unfortunately, many 
ecologically beneficial natural spaces do not meet aesthetic 
requirements on behalf of the general public (e.g. unmown lawns) and 
the aversion provoked by their appearance is stronger than the 
appreciation based on acknowledgment of their ecological beneficial 
effects. Consequently they are unwanted or tend to be beautified very 
often at the expense of their ecological values. 
In order to persuade people to maintain natural spaces despite their 
supposed aesthetic unattractiveness and not to consider other solutions, 
people must be reminded that they may like them hic et nunc for how 
they look, smell, feel or sound. As people are very often driven by direct 
experience and not by indirect knowledge, it would be good to inspire 
people to like things that the “abstract” science proves to be worthy of 
their protection. 
It is not, however, about beautifying nature or claiming that one should 
appreciate it in a disinterested way as something that has an inherent 
value. It is about encouraging an informed approach. Rendering people 
more knowledgeable amounts to making them understand how green 
spaces work and thus are useful to them as natural ecological “devices” 
as well as making them appreciate these spaces as natural. 
Even if it is debatable whether “ecological literacy” (D. Orr’s term) may 
effectively change one’s taste or one’s aesthetic experience (e.g. from 
disgust to pleasure), it may certainly modify one’s approach in such a 
way that one can overcome an initial negative response. In light of this 
ecological knowledge, people might end up liking “ugly” things that 
previously provoked their disgust: they may even start to appreciate the 
messy appearance of an uncut lawn, in spite of their usual preference 
for neatly cultivated parterres. 
One reason why people treat ecologically beneficial spaces as eyesores 
(in fact lots of them are not beautiful in an “ordinary” way) is that they 
associate the aesthetic appeal of nature with greenery, which, in turn, is 
seen through such paradigms as gardens or picturesque landscapes. 
What is more, the ecological is metaphorically represented by the color 
green in contemporary culture. People may then think that a space 
literally lacking greenery is not green in the metaphorical sense either, 
and consequently there is no reason why spaces which, in their opinion, 
are not spectacularly green should be welcome. 
However, contrary to what we are accustomed to, green is not the color 
of ecology (or at best it is a color of a shallow ecology) – greenery is not 
the most ecologically productive part of nature.* Not without a reason, 
many ecologically efficient spaces do not look very green (and vice 
versa: many green spaces are unecological despite their overriding 
greenness). 
Summing up, in order to start liking ecologically beneficial "green 
spaces," people ought to be informed and thus get rid of their aesthetic 
habits and commonplaces. Nature offers a cornucopia of colors, and 
green need not dominate! 
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* Professor Maciej Luniak (Museum and Institute of Zoology, Polish 
Academy of Sciences) suggested this approach to me.
The Existential Aesthetics of Things 
Peter Žiak 
Summary of The Existential Aesthetics of Things by Petra Baďová. 
Petra Baďová: Existenciálna estetika vecí (Nitra: Univerzita Konštantína 
Filozofa v Nitre, 2016). 132 pp. 
ISBN 978-80-558-1082-9 
As a discipline, the field of research of aesthetics is far from being 
confined to only works of art or natural entities. One of the most 
interesting areas of its research („most interesting“ because aesthetics 
situate their borders within this area, as well as unused potential) are 
things - original functional subjects- and situations in which we 
encounter them. The scientific monograph by Petra Baďová The 
Existential aesthetics of things presents a significant benefit for domestic 
aesthetics (especially for research aimed at non-artistic phenomena). 
Baďová‘s monograph is divided into three parts. The first part explores 
the medium of photography and uses an example of how two authors 
contemplate the meaning of photography and taking pictures, thereby 
creating a deeper angle than just the format of interpreted images. It 
balances side by side the works of Rineke Dijkstra's from the series 
Beach Portraits and the unearthed amateur photographs of an unknown 
artist depicting three figures on a beach during vacation. At first glance, 
the choice is surprising - on the one hand is a professional photographer 
while on the other is an amateur whose shots do not have any primary 
artistic ambitions. With regards to the phenomenon of which the author 
takes priority, it is not however, about incomparable works. The 
comparison is based on an exploration of immobility or immobilization as 
the most basic symptom of picture quality, and only then interprets the 
expressive quality of portraits and the formal aspects of images. Thus, it 
goes beyond a formal level of works and considers photography as a 
ritual, its parts perceiving the flow of time, and as an attempt to stop the 
materialization of memories. 
The second part of the monograph is an interpretation of everyday things 
in life, such as buttons, old (forgotten) toys and worn-out shoes. Baďová 
is not interested in just the original function of the object (which can be 
lost through wear and tear), but mainly in the relationship that their 
owner creates for them. By way of connotative semiotics, she tries to 
grasp the meanings which things may acquire in the context of life 
(again with an emphasis on what is somehow existentially serious). 
Subsequently, on the platform of Heidegger's analysis of the materiality 
of things, she retreats further from the surface of consideration in 
practical-utilitarian intentions and reveals the basic and original 
connectedness of human‘s being-in-the-world and how they relate to 
things. 
In the final chapter, the author reflects on the most abstract 
phenomenon, which is crossing the threshold of a door. She creates a 
theme that the threshold is not only a thing, but a crossover, that is, a 
situation over which it is intended to a significantly greater extent than 
how it usually is when crossing a threshold. In this section, Baďová does 
not leave much to be desired for those things which are daily, 
automated, disguised by veil of habit or re-usable. 
What connects these phenomena of diverse interpretations? In what 
sense does it concern an aesthetic phenomenon? First and foremost it 
emphasizes the actual experience of perceiving things - at the forefront 
is the recipient and his "alignment" which enables him to see in 
something banal, something which is vitally essential. The interpretations 
contained in Baďová‘s monograph are therefore largely subjectively 
perceived particular things and her writing quite understandably (and 
with respect to the subject of interest, perhaps necessarily) approaches 
the form of an essay. Nevertheless, the work succinctly describes the 
essence of aesthetic experience, which assumingly is distant from a 
purely utilitarian attitude towards the perceived object. Baďová‘s 
interpretation moves precisely in this plane, allowing her to consider 
seemingly uninteresting subjects as aesthetically important phenomena. 
A part of this schedule is also finding a language of interpretation. The 
author lucidly and sensitively (often very poetically) grasps subtle and 
slight connections to the border of communicativeness. It is therefore 
understandable that in many places of the interpretation, inspiration is 
looked for in Roland Barthes - because she arrives at the other side of 
that punctum (semiotically elusive element) and writes about what it 
inherently interferes in, although it may not be intermediary. Reading the 
text by Petra Baďová requires a certain effort; it is necessary to adapt to 
her optics and follow her intricate trajectory of thinking. It is also, of 
course, a way towards a new vision of reality. 
PhDr. Peter Žiak 
peter.ziak@ukf.sk 
Institute of Literary and Artistic Communication – Department of Semiotic 
Studies 
Faculty of Arts 
Constantine the Philosopher University 
Štefánikova 67 
949 74 Nitra 
Slovak Republic 
Published on October 3, 2017. 
On the Oddly Satisfying 
Evan Malone 
What does it mean for something to beoddly satisfying? There is much 
about everyday aesthetic experiences that seems obviously satisfying, 
but what can we say about those subtle experiences which so often 
flutter past our conscious endorsement, and whose value seems 
ineffable and, frankly, odd? I am thinking, here, of the lid to the board 
game box which rests gently on the trapped air inside before softly and 
evenly settling on the box, and the perfectly sized book-jacket that sits 
taut on the resting hardback, never to get caught on a precarious corner 
and tear. For you, there might be something immensely satisfying about 
the makeup compact that snaps shut with a clean crisp click that 
communicates the finality of the act, or you might find your daily moment 
of transcendental bliss in streaming videos of folks pressure-washing 
their driveways. Is there something about these kinds of experiences 
that unifies them; that makes them all oddly aesthetic? Surely we don’t 
engage with the everyday object with the expectation of aesthetic 
experience, but it presents itself in flashes of perfect fit. Isn’t that what 
we really find at the bottom of these experiences? It is trivial to point out 
the role of fit in the case of the board game box and the book jacket, but 
where is the fit in the snap of the compact? I’d like to think that 
something about the sound just fits with the task of closing it. 
I once heard a story about the design of a German luxury car. The 
designers felt that there was something about the experience of driving 
the car that was missing. After months of attempts to discern the nature 
of this luxurious je-ne-sais-quoi, one of the more intrepid designers 
sought refuge in the arts. It was at the movie theater that it dawned on 
them. When we open a car door, the interior lights come on, and they 
turn off when we start the engine. After several return trips to the 
movies, the designer realized that the interior lights should fade off, and 
it should take exactly three seconds (the time it takes for the theater 
lights to dim). This was the secret to the luxury experience. It gave a 
sense of the cinematic to the experience; your commute home from work 
is now a journey, and you are the star of the show. If you ever have the 
privilege of sitting in the driver’s seat of such a car and, perhaps, never 
heard this story, you might yet find the dimming of the lights 
synchronized with the starting of the car to be an oddly satisfying 
experience. This ‘cinematicity’ is, in my view, why certain mundane 
experiences can (sometimes violently, sometimes subtly) assert 
themselves as objects of aesthetic engagement. The kind of fit that 
connects the compact closing and the sound of the compact closing is 
exactly the kind of fit that is the work of Hollywood sound designers (or, 
apparently, the designers of luxury cars). In the movies, Dad never 
struggles to close the board game box, and the femme fatale’s gestures 
never lack for drama. This, as the case of the Dad with the board game 
box should indicate, often runs contrary to the aesthetic qualities of our 
everyday experience at large. I would argue that the resting level of 
clumsiness experienced by Dad is less ‘anesthetic’ (as might be argued 
by Dewey), and more merely aesthetically banal. As such, the 
cinematicity account of the oddly satisfying is consistent with the kinds of 
stories about everyday aesthetics which emphasize defamiliarization and 
the casting of auras. It seems that, given the resting banal aesthetic 
conditions of our everyday experience, we would be forgiven for failing 
to engage with the everyday as an aesthetic medium. Sometimes our 
experience of the everyday seems like the kind of film we would rather 
have on in the background while we work on other things than the kind 
we might dedicate two hours of our attention to. However, it is these 
small, subtle bursts of cinematicity and perfect fit that best provide us 
with the means to re-familiarize ourselves with the aesthetics of the 
everyday. In this way, we are drawn back into engagement with the 
cinemas of our lived experience. 
Perhaps this account cannot be generalized to capture every oddly 
satisfying experience, but it does seem to, at least, unify many of those 
experiences which assert themselves in this way. These oddly satisfying 
experiences are the invasion of the cinematic into the everyday, and 
they remind us of what we love about art. At the same time, the 
cinematic may also be the distillation of all of these everyday moments 
into an idealized vision of how life could be if we were more graceful 
(and, perhaps, secret agents), and everyday life was less banal. While 
many films and television shows struggle to establish a reality where the 
stars could be the everyman, the oddly satisfying does much to fool us 
into thinking that we could be the stars. Perhaps, then, the relationship 
between the cinematic and the everyday is yet another case of perfect 
fit. 
 
Evan Malone 
ecmalone@uh.edu 
 
Published August 22, 2017. 
 
 
 
 
    Deconstructing Walter Benjamin 
 
  Miklos Legrady 
 
 
Miklos Legrady, cultural revolution, acrylic on canvas, 2005 
18" x 24" - 45.72cm x 60.96cm 
 
I’m going to hurt your feelings and it’s going to upset you, but Walter   
Benjamin did not say what you think he said, nor what they said about him, 
nor what we learned in school. It is hard to believe we held illusions as 
articles of faith for decades, but then think of medieval monks in flea-ridden 
cassocks who counted angels dancing on the head of a pin. We’re not that 
far ahead; we also hold political beliefs that look plausible at the moment 
but seriously need corrections on the basis of fact. 
 
At the core of Benjamin’s argument is that which withers in the age of 
mechanical reproduction is the aura of the work of art. He’s wrong in that 
books are made by mechanical reproduction yet stories and authors 
retain their aura as much as any work of art. Munch's The Scream is 
known from reproduction yet remains haunting, as haunting as any Raven 
perched upon a bust of Pallas just above my chamber door. Without its 
aura, an image is illustration, not art. Benjamin's error comes from a 
materialism which 
says that the only meaning of art lies in an accurate rendition of reality, 
the essence of art is pictorial reproduction. 
 
Some find Benjamin complex and difficult; there’s reason for that but not 
what we'd expect. When we read something that contradicts our 
expectations, we generally skip that sentence; here we eventually find 
ourselves with shreds and hanging chads. The difficulty in reading 
Benjamin is not intellectual comprehension; it is in matching what we read 
to what he’s supposed to have said: we must censor the text to meet our 
expectations. Many of us stop reading when unable to reconcile such 
contradictions between fact and fiction, and so we leave Benjamin behind 
as "difficult." It is near impossible to interpret Benjamin according to the 
mythology woven in his name. 
  
Walter Benjamin has been praised as an early Marshall McLuhan, a social 
scientist able to discern the cultural effects of media. Yet on reading the 
text we find a political message that strays from the truth and then ignores 
it. 
Where we thought “The Work Of Art in the Age of Mechanical 
Reproduction” was research similar to today's academic scholarship, it is in 
fact Marxist propaganda. History reminds us that Marxists saw truth and 
accuracy as useful when convenient; we cannot read Benjamin innocently 
when the work has political priorities. 
 
Walter Benjamin's thesis insists that all we can ask of art is to reproduce 
reality. He writes that authorship, creativity, and aesthetics are outmoded 
Fascist concepts, and the only valid art is that made by the working class 
for political use. Benjamin is himself writing propaganda without concern for 
accuracy. He shares flawed assumptions, fact and fiction twisted to fit 
political theory; the reductions, contradictions, and leaps of faith are 
obvious. 
 
Benjamin rejected aesthetics whereas science shows that beauty and its 
complex differentiations are crucial for mental health. In the 1970s 
Abraham Moles and Frieder Nake analyzed links between beauty, 
information processing, and information theory. Physicist Paul Dirac said 
that if one works at getting beauty in one's equations, and if one has a 
really sound insight, one is on a sure line of progress. Denis Dutton was a 
philosophy professor and the editor of Arts & Letters Daily. In his book and 
Ted Talk called The Art Instinct, he suggested that humans are hard-wired 
to seek beauty. “There is evidence that perceptions of beauty are 
evolutionarily determined, that things, aspects of people and landscapes 
considered beautiful are typically found in situations likely to give 
enhanced survival of the perceiving human's genes.” 
 
One Communist writer who later left the party in disillusionment was Arthur 
Koestler. In The God That Failed and The Invisible Writing he described 
the logical contradictions and resulting sacrificium intellectus that 
Communist writers suffered. The resulting emotional damage may well 
explain Benjamin's catastrophic failure of morale and his subsequent 
suicide in a moment of crisis. 
 
Arthur Koestler wrote of Benjamin's death in France during the 1940s inThe 
Invisible Writing. “Just before we left, I ran into an old friend, the German 
writer Walter Benjamin. He was making preparations for his own escape to 
England. He has thirty tablets of a morphia-compound, which he intended 
to swallow if caught: he said they were enough to kill a horse, and gave me 
half the tablets, just in case. The day after the final refusal of my visa, I 
learned that Walter Benjamin, having managed to cross the Pyrenees, had 
been arrested on the Spanish side, and threatened with being sent back to 
France the next morning. The next morning the Spanish gendarmes had 
changed their mind, but by that time Benjamin had swallowed his 
remaining half of the pills and was dead.” 
 
  
Miklos Legrady 
legrady@me.com 
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  Thoughts on an Aesthetics of Mud 
 
Tom Baugh 
 
 
 
Because of my work as a wetlands ecologist, I am an intimate of mud. 
Mud is my ‘familiar.’ I have even had training in how to determine various 
types of mud. I have also developed a special vocabulary of pejoratives 
(not in the technical language) to apply to mud as it attempts to pull my 
boots from my feet or causes me to stumble and fall. My long-suffering 
wife has special looks for me as I return from one of my field-trips covered 
in mud. 
 
As I take the road less traveled, into flooded forests, I’m most often 
sinking into a substance called (believe it or not) ‘Muck.’ Muck is 
technically described as a hydric soil. Among other things, hydric soils 
are…well what can I say ‘specially wet mud.’ I could wax prolific on the 
beauty of mud, after all beauty is what we are about here… the swirling 
patters inscribed on the mud by slow-moving water; the different tones 
that mud presents, and the rich, thick smell of life and yes, even the smell 
of death that is always present with mud. The visual sharps and flats of 
light reflecting from the mud projects a sometimes crystal reality 
intertwined with an often other dimensional and disturbing darkness. 
 
But it is more the beauty of what mud allows or enables that appeals to 
the senses. For mud is an enabler…it might even be the original enabler, 
the primordial ooze in which the beauty of life evolved and from which it 
spread out across Earth. Here in the Southern Appalachian Mountains of 
Western North Carolina we have places that are referred to as ‘bogs.’ 
They are remnants of a habitat type that once covered extensive areas 
but have been drained and plowed-under by our species in it’s rapacious 
journey across Earth. Bogs have mud and, as we’ve said, mud enables 
life and bogs have a lot of life. At almost any time of year life abounds in 
the bogs. Even in the cold winter months the stark black and gray trunks 
of leafless trees arise from the mounds and hummocks that sit only 
centimeters above the viscous mud that wanders throughout the tolerant 
and gnarled roots of the red maple, black gum, and ash among dozens of 
other species. But it is during the warmer months of spring and summer 
and even into early fall that we see the true abundance of these mud-
enriched places. Green sedges and fountain grasses are joined by ferns 
so large and thick they are difficult to walk through. As the seasons 
progress, the multihued green is dotted by exclamation points of bright 
color from Swamp Pink and Canada lily, and later yet, the strange, blood 
red flower of sweet shrub. Even on the muddy floor we find violets with 
flowers no bigger than a quarter coin and 
in the fall the red berries of Jack in the Pulpit stand-out among the strange 
shapes of pitcher plants and mats of mosses, all greens and 
browns painted on a canvas of mud. 
I could go on and often have about these muddy, fecund places that play 
such a role in my life as an ecologist. Bogs, however, have become 
adopted by many of us who enjoy the beauty of gardens and bog plants 
are often a specialized sale item in nurseries and garden shops. In an 
attempt to bring the beauty of mud and all it enables into our daily lives, 
we try to recreate mucky bogs in our gardens. I am aware that beauty is 
indeed, often in the eye of the beholder and that there are those who might 
not find mud and muddy places that beautiful. I am sorry for them. As late 
winter gives way to early spring put your boots on and take a walk on the 
muddy wild side and explore natural beauty from my perspective…from 
the mud up. 
 
Tom Baugh 
springmountain1@att.net 
 
Chair, Environmental Aesthetics Study Group 
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  Mud, a Comment 
 
Mary Bittner Wiseman 
This short note raises invites two observations of interest to 
philosophers: one is about focused attention and the other about the role 
of judgment in the ascription of aesthetic properties. We pay attention to 
artworks because that is what they are there for, for us to focus on, to 
engage on sensory, emotional, or cognitive levels, and to appreciate. 
We tend not to pay much attention to things in our daily lives, unless 
they demand our attention as exquisite gardens, stunning sunset skies, 
or raging storms do. Part of the brief of those who work in everyday 
aesthetics is precisely to encourage us to pay attention to what we 
encounter day by day, an attention that focuses on what it offers to the 
senses, touch, and kinesthesia among them. 
 
When we do, we are apt to find the tea we are drinking, for example, to 
be not merely warm but smoky, where we find it warm and judge it to be 
smoky. This comports with Frank Sibley’s characterization of aesthetic 
properties as those for which there are no readily available criteria. It 
turns out that the criteria for most of the sense properties that have 
criteria are measurable. We measure temperature, identify color by the 
length of the light waves we see (the visible colors from shortest to 
longest wavelength are violet, blue, green, yellow, orange, and red), 
sound by the decibels of pressure of the sound waves, and so on. What 
we sense is also a function of the soundness of our sense organs, but 
the point is that there are criteria for calling something small or warm, but 
not for calling it delicate or smoky. It is on the basis of the delight that 
beauty affords that, according to Kant, we call something beautiful. In the 
same vein, I ascribe smokiness to the tea, beauty to the curve of a 
basketball player’s body as he jumps and turns, delicacy to a flower on 
the strength of how it strikes and delights me. 
 
As a bonus, the author invites us to pay attention, and close attention it 
has to be, not only to mud itself but also to what the mud enables, like 
“violets with flowers no bigger than a quarter coin” and “the strange, 
blood-red flower of the sweet shrub.” 
 
Mary Bittner Wiseman 
marigold21@comcast.net 
 
Published March 15, 2017. 
 
   Mud and Metaphor 
 
David Goldblatt 
I should like to offer a few brief comments on the Short Note, "Thoughts 
on an Aesthetics of Mud," that may help display its relevance to the 
philosophy of the arts and to suggest possible room for further work. 
 
A relatively recent theme in the field of aesthetics has been writing on 
everyday aesthetics. Among those who have brought this area to the 
light of aesthetic inquiry is the associate editor of Contemporary 
Aesthetics, Yuriko Saito, and a member of this journal’s editorial board, 
Thomas Leddy. Philosophical attention brought to bear on the 
vernacular raises issues as to what might count as objects of 
philosophical attention, just as essays about junkyards, street art, and 
anonymous architecture have proven to be generators of a host of 
questions, some of which remain problematic. Mud, being more or less 
a found object, can launch a discussion of whether and how everyday 
aesthetics can enter the realm of environmental aesthetics. 
 
In the attention paid to mud in the Short Note, questions of context and 
the ideal observer go hand in hand. Mud has devastated entire villages 
when storms along stripped hillsides create slides. Mud seems to be 
the core of swamps and quicksand, where mosquitoes breed with 
sometimes deadly results. Beauty, among other qualities in these 
contexts, drops out. The note, "Thoughts on an Aesthetics of Mud," has 
emphasized a context where aesthetic sensitivity, even to an overlooked 
substance like mud, is a location for the beautiful without yet entering the 
area of philosophy of the arts. What remains is how the move from 
sensitive attention to detail and the admiration of an otherwise ignored 
substance can be transposed into an artwork, as an aesthetic response 
and our response to artworks may overlap but are logically independent. 
 
And, to go further, there are metaphors here suitable for explication from 
continental philosophers such as Nietzsche, Foucault, Deleuze and 
Derrida, the latter tracing metaphor throughout the history of philosophy. 
Sometimes their work is clear as mud. For a writer of a certain 
imagination, such as the author of "Thoughts on an Aesthetics of Mud," 
he might do well to turn his attention to the history of the many 
metaphors associated with mud, some of them having become stale or 
frozen, and so more or less literal, thus riding the line between the 
conceptual and the poetic. In any case, metaphor is not simply a poetic 
device but an idea in and of itself. Mud, for example, had been the 
name of opium before it was prepared for smoking. Mud shows or mud 
operas were the names of travelling circuses, and we know that mud in 
your eye is about coffee and slinging mud refers to dirty politics. As a 
mere suggestion, any one of these metaphorical mud-associations 
contains the seeds of attitudes and analogies that may bear fruit for a 
certain style of aesthetics and even for writing on mud, itself. 
 
 
David Goldblatt 
goldblatt@denison.edu 
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 The Aesthetics of Mud and the Muddiness of Aesthetics 
 
Arnold Berleant 
Tom Baugh's note on the aesthetics of mud is both evocative and 
illuminating in its vivid recollection of the viscous slip and slime of mud. 
Wetlands are his professional territory and Baugh understands them 
well. Interestingly, he also appreciates this distinctive ecosystem 
aesthetically, not only with a trained eye but also for its feel, its smells, its 
sucking pull on the boot, as well as the improbable beauty of the Canada 
lily and the other flora of the bog. His appreciation is for the many 
beauties that such places offer. What some find in a garden, he finds in 
a bog: he calls this the aesthetics of mud. 
 
This may be puzzling to the philosopher for whom aesthetics is a 
discipline concerned with deciphering the experiences and meanings of 
the appreciation of beauty in the arts and in nature: what constitutes 
beauty, its appreciation, art, and aesthetic judgment more generally. 
Both philosopher and ecologist recognize the aesthetic value found on 
such occasions and circumstances, but the concerns of each are 
different and so their understanding of aesthetics is different. Rather than 
debating at cross-purposes about whose understanding is the correct 
one, it would be well to recognize that the concept of aesthetics has 
different meanings. For the wetlands ecologist, aesthetics means the 
appreciation of the range of sensible beauties in the rich environment of 
the bog. The philosopher, on the other hand, puzzles over what 
constitutes aesthetic appreciation proper, such as the appropriate 
attitude, the proper object of appreciation, the senses suitable for 
aesthetic enjoyment, the meanings embodied in such experiences, and 
the relation of aesthetic pleasure to other concerns such as function and 
utility. 
 
Yet these meanings of aesthetics are not independent of each other. 
Indeed, acknowledging the beauties in a bog challenges many of the 
tenets of traditional aesthetics. For example, appreciation of a wetland, 
as of every environment, is not directed at an object, as such, but 
involves the sensory qualities of an environment that encompasses the 
appreciator. Here one's encounter with beauty is an experience that 
requires physical, bodily involvement. It is an effort that is part of 
appreciative experience in ways comparable to the aesthetics of sport. 
Here the traditional aesthetic senses of sight and hearing are amplified 
and surrounded by the insistence of tactile engagement with the mud, 
the smell and the taste of the air, indeed the full somatic participation of 
aesthetic experience. What does this tell us about the traditional 
paradigm of aesthetic appreciation? It would be helpful for the ecologist 
to temper his sensory delights by considering the meanings and 
implications of those pleasures, just as it is incumbent on the 
philosopher to recognize the false constraints that traditional aesthetics 
imposes on appreciation. These involve dismissing the need for distance 
and disinterestedness, engaging the tactile, olfactory, and kinesthetic 
sensory modalities, and recognizing the aesthetic appeal of function and 
practice. 
Recent developments in philosophical aesthetics have powerful 
implications for traditional theory. The short note on mud exemplifies the 
increasing attention to environmental aesthetics, an interest that 
undermines the conventional focus of aesthetics on an art object. For in 
environment there is no object, as such, but rather a diffuse scene or 
landscape that involves the appreciative participant. And, more recently, 
everyday aesthetics has gained the attention of aestheticians despite the 
fact that it ignores the Kantian convention that dismisses function and 
relegates practical interest and use to a lower level. Everyday aesthetics, 
on the contrary, does not countenance a priori constraints but legitimizes 
purpose and function on occasion as aesthetic features. 
 
These two concerns with aesthetic value, then, the occasions in which 
we have aesthetic satisfaction and their theoretical understanding, are 
related but different. One requires perceptual openness and sensitivity 
together with a cultivated sensibility informed by the knowledge and 
background that conduce to them. For the other, to be valid, we need a 
cognitive activity that tries to account for those experiences on their own 
terms without dictating in advance what is acceptable and what is not. 
And each must recognize the legitimacy of the other. Appreciation as 
perceptual engagement is not a cognitive exercise, and the theory that 
accounts for the values in a bog is not aesthetic appreciation. To 
confound the two is to impede both: muddiness can be found in more 
places than a bog. 
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